Foreword/Preámbulo:
The following text was in my old faceinstone blog. Originally in English, I promised a translation that was never delivered. Now, I live to my word. What follows is a bilingual text on the nature of evil and its necesity. The original english text has undergone some corrections and editing, which are reflected in the translation as well.
El siguiente texto estaba en mi antiguo blog faceinstone. Originalmente en Inglés, prometí una traducción que nunca realice. Ahora, cumplo mi palabra. Sigue un texto bilíngüe sobre la naturaleza del mal y su necesidad. El texto original en inglés ha sufrido correcciones y edición, las cuales también se vierten en la traducción.
Bilingual Version/Versión Bilingüe
A word to the reader/ Al lector:
The following post is long. Patience, however, and willingness to unravel the skein shall, I believe, be rewarded well.
El post que sigue es largo. Sin embargo, la paciencia y la disposición de desenredar la madeja serán, creo, bien recompensados.
The myth of the Garden of Eden, alike all myths, is strange. It is a well that can never be exhausted . Many questions come together to puzzle the eye trained for paradox and whose inclination lies with the problem and not with the solution. It poses questions that touch the fabric of existence and of our nature and condition. It calls forth the meaning of freedom and the meaning of the law. A skeletal review of the facts:
El mito del Jardín del Edén, como todos los mitos, es extraño. Es un pozo que nunca se agota. Muchas preguntas se dan cita para desconcertar al ojo entrenado en la paradoja y cuya inclinación esta con el problema y no con la solución. Plantea interrogantes que tocan el tejido mismo de la existencia, y de nuestra naturaleza y condición. Pone en el estrado el significado de la libertad y el significado de la ley. Primero, una revisión somera de los hechos:
God creates man and woman in a paradise devoid of any of the traits marking our life that we call evils -death, pain, old age, toil, disease, uncertainty... He places Adam and Eve in this land and they are free to do whatever they want. They are at leisure to wander in their naked inocence without any command except one, which we know all too well: "Thou shall not eat from the tree of knowledge...". We also know the outcome well enough. Eve is tempted by the snake and this is the fall of mankind. Mankind is condemned to toil, death, mortality and pain. Man's existence is thereafter his burden, as he is capable of evil: with the influx of disobedience, he now comes to know good and evil and becomes accountable for himself - intoxicated with "sin", man being capable of evil, he is forever stained.
Dios crea al hombre y a la mujer en un paraíso desprovistos de cualquiera de las características que marcan nuestras vidas y que llamamos "males" - la muerte, el dolor, el envejecimiento, el esfuerzo, la enfermedad, la incertidumbre... Dios coloca a Adán y Eva en este lugar libres de hacer lo que deseen. Pueden vagar en su desnuda inocencia sin mandamiento, excepto uno, que todos conocemos demasiado bien: "No comerás del árbol de la sabiduría..." También conocemos bien el desenlace. Eva es tentada por la serpiente y ello constituye la caída del hombre. La humanidad es condenada al esfuerzo, la muerte, la mortalidad y el dolor. De ese punto en adelante, la existencia del hombre es su carga, dado que es capaz de hacer el mal: con el influyo de la desobediencia, llega a conocer el bien y el mal y se vuelve responsable de sí mismo - intoxicado con el "pecado", siendo capaz de hacer el mal, el hombre queda por siempre maculado.
But, if man was there in Eden, in escence pure and uncorrupted, clean of sin and doubt, why place the tree there? Why such a commandment? This question concerns the origin and the nature of the law, first of all; second, it calls to question the nature of man; finally, it concerns the intention of the creator as to this, the crown of his creation.
Mankind was to be in the Garden as an inmortal being. Incapable of dying, everything that could be done should eventually be done, as probabilities command. Therefore, the tree having being placed in the Garden, it was foreseeable that mankind should eventually sink their teeth into the apple. This explains the commandment: god did not wish man to eat from the apple, as the legislator does not wish man to kill or steal.
Pero, si el hombre estaba ahí en el edén en esencia puro e incorrupto, limpio de pecado y de duda, ¿por qué colocar el árbol? ¿Por qué tal mandamiento? Esta pregunta concierne en primer lugar, al origen y naturaleza de la ley; en segundo lugar, nos llama a interrogar la naturaleza del hombre; en último término, concierne a la intención del creador respecto a la corona de su creación.
La humanidad iba a morar en el jardín como un ser inmortal. Incapaz de morir, todo lo que podía llegar a hacerse debería eventualmente ser obrado, según lo dictaminan las probabilidades. Por ende, habiéndose colocado el árbol en el Jardín, era previsible que el hombre eventualmente hundiría sus dientes en la manzana. Esto explica el mandamiento: dios no deseaba que el hombre comiese de la manzana, al igual que el legislador no desea que el hombre mate o robe.
La humanidad iba a morar en el jardín como un ser inmortal. Incapaz de morir, todo lo que podía llegar a hacerse debería eventualmente ser obrado, según lo dictaminan las probabilidades. Por ende, habiéndose colocado el árbol en el Jardín, era previsible que el hombre eventualmente hundiría sus dientes en la manzana. Esto explica el mandamiento: dios no deseaba que el hombre comiese de la manzana, al igual que el legislador no desea que el hombre mate o robe.
Man in paradise however, was pure, innocent. Innocence implies not knowing the nature of inclination nor of its fulfillment -desire and gratification go hand in hand, unquestioned. A child is said to be innocent as they cannot concieve of their inclination as "good" or "evil". In this sense, a child is not capable of being tried, as they do not know the meaning of their actions -they cannot place any evil to their inclination, neither can they calculate the consequences attached to them in such terms. Legislators place commandments and laws on people capable of such discriminations. People are conceived as capable of evil, and of inclining towards evil knowingly. Thus the law presuposes the crime and also the understanding that the crime is such. It furthermore implies the previous commision of the crime: why should there have been any legislation on traffic before there were cars and crashes and all the problems that come from many cars coming and going along the streets of cities? The legislator can foresee the crime, as it has happened before. However, in the case under our consideration, the legislator being god, and the law being the first law set upon an innocent creature, this law does not presupose a crime that has already been commited before and shall therefore be commited again. The law set by God decrees the crime: a negative commandment in such special circumstances, calls forth the action it forbids -in this case, sin... Odd....
El hombre, sin embargo, era puro e inocente en el paraíso. La inocencia implica desconocer la naturaleza de la inclinación ni su satisfacción - el deseo y la gratificación van de la mano, sin ser cuestionados. Se dice de un niño que es inocente dado que no puede concebir sus inclinaciones como "buenas" o "malas". En este sentido, un niño no puede ser juzgado, dado que no conocen el significado de sus acciones - no pueden atribuir el mal a sus inclinaciones, ni pueden calcular las consecuencias que conllevan en dichos términos. Los legisladores imponen mandamientos y leyes a aquellos que son capaces de dichas distinciones. Las personas se conciben como capaces del mal y de inclinarse por el mal a sabiendas. La ley, por ende, presupone el crimen y presupone además que se entiende que el crimen es tal. Implica, además, la comisión previa del crimen: ¿por qué tendría que haber habido legislación alguna regulando el tráfico antes de que hubiesen autos y choques y todos los problemas que producen los autos yendo y viniendo por las calles de las ciudades? El legislador puede prever la ocurrencia del crimen, porque el crimen ha sido cometido anteriormente. Sin embargo, en el caso que consideramos, siendo dios el legislador, y siendo esta ley la primera ley dictada sobre una criatura inocente, la ley misma no presupone que se ha cometido un crimen que por ende será cometido nuevamente. La ley fijada por Dios decreta el crimen: un mandamiento negativo en circunstancias tan especiales, llama al acto que prohíbe - en este caso, el pecado... Extraño...
The paradox is that, in the Garden of Eden, man and woman have no previous crime hanging over their heads, no knowledge do they possess to discriminate their inclinations into good and bad. Yet God, legislator supreme, has placed the tree and the snake. God supreme has laid down the law. Therefore, the fall was within the provisions of God. We have said that the legislator can only pass a law because he knows that the crime will occur: man has to commit it at one moment or the other. The legislator of this world can only fix a law because he has seen the crime before; but the legislator in question, rules before any crime is commited.
La paradoja es que, en el Jardín del Edén, ni hombre ni mujer tienen crímenes previos que los persigan, ni están en posesión del conocimiento para discriminar sus inclinaciones en buenas y malas. Sin embargo, Dios, legislador supremo, coloca ahí al árbol y a la serpiente. Dios, ser supremo, ha fijado la ley. Por ende, la caída estaba dentro de las provisiones de Dios. Ya hemos dicho que el legislador sólo puede crear una ley porque sabe que el crimen ocurrirá: el hombre debe cometerlo en un momento u otro. El legislador de este mundo sólo puede establecer una ley porque ha visto el crimen antes; pero el legislador en cuestión la dicta antes de la comisión de cualquier crimen.
Quaestiones: Prima: why the commandment?; Secunda: why the snake?
Quaestiones: Prima: ¿Por qué el mandamiento?; Segunda: ¿por qué la serpiente?
Responso ad prima quaestio: This question concerns the decree of the fall: the law was laid down as a crime was foreseeable. Only upon a creature capable of such an action can a law be passed. No legislator oversees the behavior of lions or maggots. The answer hereby given is abstruse, but -I believe, sound.
Responso ad prima quaestio: Esta pregunta concierne al haberse decretado la caída: la ley fue fijada dado que el crimen era previsible. Sólo se puede dictar una ley sobre una criatura capaz de la acción que la ley condena. Ningún legislador norma la conducta de leones y gusanos. La respuesta que aquí se da es abstrusa pero - según creo, correcta.
What lies behind the mystery of love? Love lies in the nature of its object. The object of love is loved for two reasons: first of all, a resemblance of oneself. One recognizes something of oneself in what one loves. But also an absolute difference and independence of oneself. God has created this flower to crown his creation, mankind. Mankind must be what gives all the rest its meaning (after all, all the rest of creation has to come to man to recieve its name, thus at least says the myth). But this creation - man - must be something he can pour his love upon. A being merely capable of good is not complete, as it is not independent of its creator. Robots cannot be loved because they are devoid of any independence, and can act only upon the set of commands they have previously been built for: their esence is set and is totally predictable. They share the nature of a tool: a knife answers to the movements of the hand that handles it. A child coming from the bossom of a woman can be loved because it has its own will. The children we beget are finally destined to rebel and leave us, to seek their own path and to become something we could not foresee.
¿Qué se esconde detrás del misterio del amor? El amor reside en la naturaleza de su objeto. El objeto del amor es amado por dos razones: primero que todo, es una semblanza de uno mismo. Uno reconoce algo de si mismo en lo que ama. Pero también (reconoce) una diferencia e independencia absolutas respecto de uno mismo. Dios ha creado la flor que corona su creación, la humanidad. La humanidad debe ser lo que le da al resto (de la creación) su significado (después de todo, el resto de la creación ha debido venir al hombre para recibir su nombre - así por lo menos lo dice el mito). Pero esta creación - el hombre - debe ser algo sobre lo que pueda derramar su amor. Un ser capaz meramente de hacer el bien no esta completo, dado que no sería independiente de su creador. Los robots no pueden ser amados porque carecen totalmente de independencia, y su actuar sólo tiene lugar dentro de un conjunto de comandos para los que han sido previamente construidos: su esencia esta fija y es totalmente predecible. Comparten la naturaleza de la herramienta: un cuchillo obedece los movimientos de la mano que lo empuña. Uno niño salido de la matriz de una mujer puede ser amado porque tiene su propia voluntad. Los niños que engendramos están en último término destinados a rebelarse y dejarnos para buscar su propio camino y convertirse en algo que no podemos prever.
What diferentiates man from a robot is the exercise of will, freedom. Man is able to decide in the face of any commandment: obedience or rebelion, good or evil. If God is only good in nature, then, if he creates something that he can love, it must be something capable of escaping his commandment, of attaining differentiation. What differentiates from the good path? Evil, rebelion, disobedience. Mankind must be capable of choice if it is not to be merely a tool. Therefore, the answer to the first question has been provided: man must fall, if he is to fulfill his nature as it is set to be. Only something whose nature is unpredictable (and therefore independent of the lovers will) can be loved; only something that can, out of free will, join with us and share with us can be loved. Nevetheless, love can be dissapointed: the loved one can choose a path that strays from us, and can leave us. What is loved can also become despisable, or even the object of hatred. Man must fall, in order to be able to return to the creator who loves him yet lets him fall, as if not, no love could be possible. The parable of the prodigal son explains this thoroughly. The loving father also presupposes the legislator and guardian of the law. The loving father is the one that overturns the punishment of the legislator -true love forgives, but forgiveness needs straying and fault and falling: the prodigal son is dear to the father and the father can forgive him. The older brother embodies the legislator: one that can only see guilt and spit out sentence, as he presupposes evil in the nature of man - the law and the legislator discern man as evil, it is what their job calls for.
Lo que diferencia al hombre del robot es el ejercicio del albedrío, la libertad. El hombre es capaz de decidir enfrentado a cualquier mandamiento: obediencia o rebelión, bien o mal. Si Dios es en su naturaleza únicamente bueno, entonces, si crea algo que pueda amar, debe ser algo capaz de escapar a su mandato, de diferenciarse. ¿Qué se diferencia del buen camino? El mal, la rebelión, la desobediencia. La humanidad debe ser capaz de escoger si va a ser algo más que una mera herramienta. Por lo tanto, la respuesta a la primera pregunta ha sido dada: el hombre debe caer, si es que va a realizar su naturaleza según esta ha sido determinada. Sólo algo cuya naturaleza sea impredecible (y por ende independiente de la voluntad del que lo ama) puede ser amado: sólo algo que pueda escoger una camino que se aleje de nosotros, y que nos pueda abandonar. Lo que se ama también se puede volver despreciable, o incluso objeto de odio. El hombre debe caer para poder volver al crear que lo ama y aún así lo deja caer, porque si no, el amor no sería posible. La parábola del hijo pródigo explica esto a cabalidad. El padre cariñoso también presupone al legislador y al guardian de la ley. El padre cariñoso es el que anula el castigo del legislador - el amor perdona, pero el perdón necesita el desvarío y la falta y la caída: el hijo prodigo es caro a su padre, y su padre lo puede perdonar. El hermano mayor representa al legislador: alguien que sólo ve culpa y que escupe una sentencia, dado que presupone que la naturaleza del hombre es el mal - la ley y el legislador disciernen que el hombre es malo, porque es lo que su trabajo exige de él.
The commandment was an order not to do something. It needed an instance: something that was forbidden but could be done. It could have been anything. The tree of knowledge embodies the conciousness of transgression. Only eating the forbidden fruit can mankind rise to the possibility of the true esence concealed within. The apple could have been anything -a fig it is also said. What lies in the knowledge is this conciousness that one can go against what is set, face the consequences and be legible for punishment or forgiveness. Mankind can become an object of love, and the father can appear.
El mandamiento fue de abstenerse de hacer algo. Necesitaba una instancia: algo que estuviera prohibido pero que se pudiera hacer. Podía ser cualquier cosa. El Árbol del Conocimiento es la materialización de la consciencia de la transgresión. Sólo al comer la fruta prohibida puede el hombre elevarse a la posibilidad de la verdadera esencia que se esconde en él. La manzana podría haber sido cualquier cosa - también se dijo que había sido un higo. Este conocimiento consiste en ser consciente que uno puede ir contra lo que ha sido dictaminado, enfrentar las consecuencias y ser legible para el castigo o el perdón. La humanidad se convierte en objeto de amor, y el padre puede aparecer.
("Said the straight man to the late man: -'where have you been?' -'I´ve been here and I've been there and I've been in between' " -King Crimson, "I Talk to the Wind")
(Pregunto el hombre recto al hombre tardío - "¿Donde has estado? - "He estado por aquí y por allá y he estado entre medio" - King Crimson "I Talk to the Wind")
Responso ad secunda quaestio: For man to fall, there had to be a law that was set. This can be deduced from the preceding reasonings. The transgression of the law set the fall: man now knew, as he had done evil.
Responso ad secunda quaestio: para que el hombre cayese, debía haber una ley ya establecida. Esto se puede deducir de los razonamientos precedentes. La transgresión de la ley determina la caída: el hombre ahora sabía, dado que había obrado el mal.
Yet, this transgression was meant to happen. Provided, as was said, a non-ending life span in a place that, however big, was not infinite, man or woman were supposed at some point to stand before the forbidden tree. If not, the instance to precipitate the fall would have been lacking. Man's innocent disobedience (as it comes out of ignorance of the meaning of disobedience) needed a catalyst, and the serpent that wrapped itself around the tree was this instrument. The serpent embodies the realization that what is forbidden is a possibility that is being denied. It calls for the questioning of the commandment, and of its meaning. No wonder doubt and curiosity were regarded as sin in Christian belief. Eve, brought to the consideration of why such a commandment was set, accessed a latency that lay within her.
The snake sets into motion something already present in potence, and this Augustine saw clearly. However, passing from potency to act is the natural course of all that must develop, and natural development is good (Aristotle). What is Good is in one way understood as the end or final destination of natural movement. Again, man must fall. But the thought is no transgression until it is enacted: people can dream of fornicating the neighbor's spouse, sending all criminals to the gas chambers or robbing a bank. Only enacting these thoughts constitutes a crime and therefore makes the doer liable of recieving the punishment accorded by the magistrate; and only in this instance can the loving father appear, as he can bestow forgiveness. Nothing can move itself into action (Aristotle, again), and there always has to be an efficient cause, and this efficient cause is always external to what is moved. An efficient cause being needed in the equation, the serpent was included amongst the dwellers in the garden.
Final Considerations.
Regarding love and forgiveness in the face of the law and punishment: God creates man capable of falling, and in so doing, decrees the fall, as all that is possible must at some point happen, otherwise, it is impossible, for a possibility that can never be actualized will never be so, and is therefore no possibility. Conferred with inmortality, Adam and Eve had time, and the sufficient cause for a possibility in potency to express as act is time. Mortal men do not express all the possibilities that lay in them for this very reason: mortality sets a limit for the expression of possibilities. If Borges is right, an inmortal man shall at one point or another exhaust all the possibilities that lie dormant for him.
Respetcto al amor y el perdón ante la ley y el castigo: dios crea al hombre capaz de caer, y al hacerlo, decreta la caída, dado que todo lo que es posible debe suceder en algún momento; de lo contrario, sería imposible que una posibilidad fuese tal si nunca pudiera llegar al acto, y por ende no sería una posibilidad. Habiéndosele conferido la inmortalidad, Adán y Eva tenían tiempo, dado que la causa suficiente para que una posibilidad en potencia se exprese en acto es el tiempo. Los hombres mortales no expresan todas las posibilidades latentes en ellos por la misma razón: su mortalidad fija un límite a la expresión de sus posibilidades. Si Borges esta en lo correcto, un hombre inmortal, en algún momento, agotará todas las posibilidades latentes en él.
Ergo, man had to fall. Freedom was his nature, this terrible freedom understood as the capacity and the possibility of willing what is good or what is evil, obedience or rebellion, fidelity or treason. But if man never enacted the possibility of wrongdoing, his nature would never become act, and therefore, freedom would be an impossibility. The fall was therefore necessary, and rebellion was the natural end of the first man and woman created, as they were incomplete, undeveloped, children that had to become adults. Never sinning, never disobeying, they would have been devoid of choice, and therefore, not free, and therefore, not complete, and therefore, not loveable.
Kant somehow implies that freedom has to do more with dignity than with happiness. Freedom gives man his dignity and his position amongst all creatures. The crown of God's creation was meant to rebel, and therefore suffer, die, sweat, suffer hunger, kill one another, beget children, love and hate. This gives him his dignity as he has to stand before reality and decide in the face of it. Building his own path, a path for which he himself is responsible and accountable for, before other men, before the creator, before the mirror every morning, he must endure the burden of being forever the object of legislation, law, punishment.
Kant de alguna manera implica que la libertad tiene más que ver con la dignidad que con la felicidad. La libertad le da al hombre su dignidad y su posición entre el resto de la criaturas. La corona de la creación de Dios debía rebelarse, y por ende sufrir, morir, sudar, padecer hambre, matarse los unos a los otros, engendrar hijos, amar y odiar. Esto le da su dignidad, dado que se alza frente al a realidad y decide en consecuencia. Al forjar su propio camino, un camino por el que es responsable y por el que debe responder ante los otros hombres, ante el creador, ante el espejo todas las mañanas, el hombre debe soportar la carga de ser por siempre objeto de la legislación, de la ley, del castigo.
The law regulates things because of the potency of evil that freedom carries. The law sees the evil in man and wishes to prevent it. This is why happiness is never possible in the public sphere: this is Ceasar's realm, terrible Ceasar., the sword, blind justice, inequality, power, strife. However, the very capability of falling and sinning and rebelling and wrongdoing, and the consequent existence of punishment, also calls for another side of the coin: love as forgiveness is not possible without the enactment of evil. However, forgiveness is the inversion of the equation: seeing men act bad, it recognizes the good in them, in potency or intermingled in their flaws and faults, as it is an offspring off the bossom of love.
La ley regula las cosas debido a la potencia para hacer el mal que el hombre porta. La ley ve el mal en el hombre y desea prevenirlo. Es por esto que la felicidad nunca es posible en la esfera pública: este es el reino del Cesar, el terrible Cesar, la espada, la justicia ciega, la desigualdad, el poder, la lucha. Sin embargo, la mismísma capacidad de caer y de pecar y de rebelarse y de hacer el mal, y la consecuente existencia del castigo, también exigen el otro lado de la moneda: el amor como perdón no es posible sin el mal en acto. Sin embargo, el perdón es la inversión de la ecuación: viendo que el hombre obra el mal, reconoce el bien en él, en potencia o entrelazado con sus debilidades y faltas, dado que ha sido engendrado de la matriz del amor.
Christians have never understood this simple yet complex message, the only one Christ every gave (someone once said that the life of men and their meaning are reduced to one decisive act, one decisive thought). It is not mere coincidence that the church, aspiring to a grip on men, overburdened them with sin and became a judge and legislator. Jewish religion was entangled with power and politics. Islam the same. The Church, since it became the institutionalized Church, had to follow suit.
Power and Politics and the public sphere is the realm where a supposed good is to be imposed over men. It is not the admonishing advice, the moral imperative that here speaks. It is the sword that commands obedience of men in esence free, therefore, always liable and accountable for the possibility they have of wrongdoing, of disobeying, of rebelling. Power always speaks sound reasons of what is good and desirable. However, it stresses every stop, coma, colon, exclamation and conclusion with a flash of the blade it carries: it is a force that is speaking to men it percieves bad, potential enemies, traitors, renegades, disobeyers. Hence, it is armed. As in the garden, within the world called and demonstrated as "good", evil lies dormant. That is why legislation and the sword exist.
Power sees obedient men as potential wrongdoers, disrupters of order, enemies. The good man is simply a bad man that has not shown himself. This is the equation that regulates the world of Ceasar. Institutionalized religion, as it also aspires to a sway over men, to lay down over them what is good and desirable, and therefore, what they should aspire to and what the order of their volitions should be, arms its tongue (when it cannot show the blade) with sin, damnation and fear. Every reason is stressed with those admonishons of flames and suffering, of the judgement that lies beyond the grave...
This, of course when it does not wield the sword. Empowered religion is a double torment: not only the real threat of the blade, but also the torture of the mind and the soul. The culprit not only is punished in this world, but also cursed in the next: absolutely damned, ici et la. No other force acts with such hatred, disregard and mercilessness than the force that establishes its truth with the certitude of dogma. Revolutionaries, fanatics, reaccionaries, orthodoxies of all manners and types, moralists: all belong in this bag. Woe to men when the virtuous cease power! Be it the virute of humbleness and forgiveness, the virtue of the citizen, the virtue of the superman and biological superiority, of right wing order and peace, or of the comarade in the socialist society.
Christ equates love with forgiveness -the latter flows naturally from the former. We have said that love presupposes freedom. Freedom is the fact that the loved one is independent, as we cannot control their will. Freedom is always the possibility of fault and wrongdoing. Yet, without this possibility, no love is possible, just enjoyment of possession (as we "love" a car or a "pet"). Qu' est ce que se tire de ceci? When love is the one that considers, under and beyond all the faults and petiness, it can fathom the good. The focus of Ceasar is evil even in the obdient subject; love regards good, even in the wrongdoer